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Abstract
In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovation we ana-
lyze guaranteed feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables from a dynamic efficiency
and social welfare point of view. Specifically, we model decisions about the technological
innovation with convex costs within the framework of a game-theoretic model, and discuss
implications for optimal policy design under different assumptions regarding regulatory
pre-commitment. We find that in terms of dynamic efficiency no pre-commitment policies
are shown to be at least as good as the pre-commitment ones. Thus, a government with
a preference for innovation being performed if the achievable cost reduction is high should
be in favor of the no pre-commitment regime.
Keywords: Renewable electricity; Feed-in tariffs; Regulatory pre-commitment; Innova-
tion; Energy policy
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1 Introduction
Renewable energy is considered an important element in a sustainable energy development.
In many countries renewable energy promotion policies have been put into place. As far
as electricity generation from renewables is concerned, there has been much debate in
recent years about the relative merits of guaranteed feed-in tariffs (FIT) and tradable
green certificates (TGC), mainly in the form of qualitative discussion (e.g. Menanteau
et al.; 2003; Nielsen and Jeppesen; 2003; Berry; 2002), and much less so in the form of
more rigorous formal analysis (e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen; 2001, 2002; Amundsen and
Nese; 2002).
Building on seminal work by Weitzman (1974, 1978), Pizer (1999a,b) studies the non-
equivalence of tax and quota policies given uncertainty and shows that uncertainty causes
the optimal amount of emission abatement to increase, which justifies a preference for price
over quantity control. Madlener et al. (2009) show that in terms of static efficiency a price
(subsidy) policy to promote renewable energy is equivalent to a quantity (quota) policy
for a competitive but not generally a duopoly market for power when competitors have
different production costs for renewable (but not conventional) energy. In this paper, we
focus on FIT and extend the static analysis to incorporate technological innovation that
lowers the (increasing) marginal cost of production of electricity from renewable sources.
From environmental economics it is known that the dynamic efficiency of a policy
depends on whether or not the government pre-commits to a certain policy target (e.g.
Denicolo`; 1999). In our analysis we want to find out in which of two cases the subsidy con-
trol instrument provides a stronger incentive for innovation favoring renewable or “green”
electricity, (1) when the government adjusts its policy in response to innovation (no pre-
commitment), or (2) when it cannot react immediately to innovation (pre-commitment).
In contrast to Denicolo` (1999), we find that the relative merits of the subsidy policies are
the same in the two scenarios from the point of view of social welfare maximization. How-
ever, in terms of dynamic efficiency, this equivalence does not necessarily hold. Rather,
the no pre-commitment policy is shown to support equilibrium outcomes with innovations
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that might not be attainable under pre-commitment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives optimal subsidy
policies for assuming no pre-commitment on the part of the government when innovation
is present. Section 3 contains the analogous analysis for the pre-commitment case. Section
4 discusses the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 and concludes.
2 Optimal subsidy policy in the presence of innova-
tion: no pre-commitment case
In the no pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to have the information, ability
and obligation to respond to technological innovation by adjusting its subsidy policy. Let
there be N + 1 competitive electricity generators in the market, one of them being the
potential innovator, assumed to possess the patent covering the rights for the new tech-
nology. Innovation reduces the marginal cost of green electricity, and the innovator can
license the new technology to other producers in return of a royalty. Let us assume that
prior to innovation all firms have an identical cost structure for producing green electricity
of the simplistic form
Cg(xg) = b1xg + b2xg
2, (1)
with b1 > 0, b2 > 0, to reflect decreasing marginal returns (DMR) in the production of green
electricity. DMR is a sensible assumption because the use of renewables (in particular solar
and wind) involves technologies that have not yet reached maturity. Accordingly, there is
scope for (exogenous) innovation, resulting in a new cost function of the form
Cgn(xg) = b1nxg + b2xg
2, (2)
where Cgn denotes the cost function after innovation and b1n < b1 the reduced part of
the marginal cost. Note that b2 is unaffected by the innovation for simplicity (b1n < b1
is sufficient to mitigate DMR). Thus, (b1 − b1n) reflects the importance of the innovation.
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The cost function for brown electricity (i.e. from conventional sources such as coal, nuclear
etc.) is assumed to be linear, Cb(xb) = cbxb.
The R&D investment required for the innovation is denoted by R[Cg(xg) − Cgn(xg)],
with R′(·) > 0 and R′′(·) > 0. This means that the R&D outlay increases progressively as
a function of the size of the achievable cost reduction. Therefore, R&D does not display
increasing marginal returns, reflecting the fact that no particular technology has dominated
the market for renewable electricity to this day. Given the continuity assumptions made in
(1) and (2), for any fixed value of xg, R[Cg(xg)−Cgn(xg)] can be rewritten as R(b1− b1n).
We consider a parametric version of function R(·) of the form R(b1 − b1n) = r(b1 − b1n)
2,
with parameter r > 0 reflecting the concavity of the function. In particular, the higher r,
the higher the marginal cost of innovation.
On the demand side, we assume that brown and green electricity are perfect substitutes.
Thus the demand function for electricity takes the following linear form:
p(Q) = a−Q = a−
N+1∑
i=1
(xib + xig) ,
where Q denotes the total quantity of electricity supplied in the market, xib, the quantity
of conventional electricity produced by firm i, and xig, that of green electricity. Further,
we assume that b1 < cb, i.e. marginal costs of green electricity are lower than those of
brown electricity for small quantities, and (cb − b1n) is sufficiently smaller than b2(a− cb),
i.e. the average electricity price on the market, p, will always be given by the marginal
cost of brown electricity cb.
The government observes whether a firm operates with the old or the new technology1
and is assumed to maximize social welfare. The externality function of green electricity2
(including avoided social cost of producing brown electricity) is assumed to have a simple,
1This is a plausible assumption since, in reality, the electricity producers are required to file the technical
description of their power generating technology to the regulator.
2Note that, in the real world, the quantification of the (positive and negative) externalities associated
with power generation from renewables is subject to several complications (e.g. So¨derholm and Sundqvist;
2003). The value of the external benefits (including avoided environmental damages and learning-by-doing
effects) is likely to depend on the particular composition of the technology portfolio used to produce
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linear-quadratic form:
D(xg) = d1xg − d2x
2
g, d1, d2 > 0. (3)
The quadratic term reflects the fact that marginal avoided social cost of brown electricity
decreases with higher quantities of green electricity produced and might attain negative
values if large quantities of green electricity are produced.3 In order to exclude the possi-
bility of extremely high social cost of additional production of green power, we additionally
assume that parameter d2 is sufficiently small such that d2(N + 1)(cb − b1n) < b2d1.
Subsidy (or negative tax) here refers to a transfer paid by the government or electricity
consumers to the suppliers of green electricity. Thus, producers receive a surcharge s per
unit of green electricity.4 The decisions of the agents can be represented by a game with
the following players: firms 1, 2, . . . , N +1, and government G. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that firm no. 1 is the potential innovator.
Now we analyze the decision sequencing under subsidy control with no pre-commitment.
There are three decision stages, described in the following and summarized in Figure 1.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (NI), to innovate and offer N licenses
in the competition stage III (IN ), or to innovate and offer no licenses in stage III (I0).
Stage II. Given the decision of firm 1 in stage I, the government determines the subsidy
levels for non-innovating and innovating firms in order to maximize social welfare.
(IIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, the government introduces a subsidy sNI per unit of output
for all firms (decision node G1).
electricity, and thus also the amount of the brown electricity displaced and the (environmental) benefit
incurred.
3This can be motivated by arguing that with more intensive utilization of renewables, environmentally
and socially less benign projects are also being realized.
4In reality it is usually the power fed into the grid that counts, which due to on-site electricity consump-
tion and transmission losses may be considerably less than gross production. This difference is neglected
here for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Extensive-form game representation, no pre-commitment case, subsidy policy
(IIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage III, the government
introduces two levels of subsidy: sIN for the innovator and the firms that adopted
the new technology and sNIN for the firms that did not adopt the new technology
(decision node G2).
(IIc) Finally, if firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage III,
the subsidies are sI0 for the innovator and sNI0 for the competitors (decision node
G3).
Stage III. Given the innovation decision of firm 1 and the decision of the government
about the subsidy level, firms 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, all firms have identical cost functions Cg(·) and compete
in quantities given subsidy level sNI per unit of green electricity (subgame ΓNI).
(IIIb) If firm 1 did innovate and committed to offer N licenses in stage III, then it first
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offers licenses to N competitors in return of a royalty υ given subsidy levels sIN and
sNIN . Firms 2, . . . , N + 1 can either accept (I) or reject (NI) this offer. Since firms
2, . . . , N + 1 are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the offer
and operate with cost function Cg(·) (competition in quantities will take place in
subgame ΓIN ,NI) or all of them will accept it and operate with cost function Cgn(·)
(competition in subgame ΓIN ,I).
(IIIc) If firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage III, then
firm 1, operating with cost function Cgn(·), and firms 2, . . . , N + 1, operating with
cost function Cg(·), respectively, compete in quantities given their subsidy levels sI0
and sNI0 (subgame ΓI0).
These three decision stages define an extensive-form game as shown in Figure 1. The
information revealed in the earlier stages of this game is taken as given in the corresponding
subsequent stages. Thus, in the earlier stages, rational players anticipate the equilibrium
outcomes in every subsequent stage. Each game branch starting with an information set
can thus be considered as a subgame, giving rise to the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE) as the solution concept to be applied. As usual, the SPE solution can be obtained
by backward induction.
Lemma 2.1. In subgame ΓNI (stage IIIa), all firms’ quantities of green electricity are
given by
xig(NI, sNI) =
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
. (4)
Proof: see Appendix on p.14.
Lemma 2.2. In stage IIIb, firm 1’s equilibrium offer υ∗ is given by
υ∗ =


(b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
2
otherwise.
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This offer is always accepted by a firm of type 2 in equilibrium5. Quantities of green
electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are
x1g(IN , (sNIN , sIN )) =
cb − b1n + sIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN )) =


(cb − b1 + sNIN )
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix on p.15.
Lemma 2.3. In subgame ΓI0 (stage IIIc), quantities of green electricity produced by firm
1 and firms of type 2 are given by
x1g(I0, (sNI0, sI0)) =
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
;
x2g(I0, (sNI0, sI0)) =
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.17.
Lemma 2.4. In stage IIa (subgame starting at node G1), the government chooses subsidy
level
s∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.17.
Lemma 2.5. In stage IIb (subgame starting at node G2), the government chooses any
combination of subsidy levels
(s∗NIN , s
∗
IN
) =
(
s∗NIN ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
,
where
s∗NIN ≥ (b1 − b1n) +
[b2(N − 2)− d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
5As usual, we assume that in the case of indifference firms of type 2 decide in favor of the adoption of
the new technology.
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Proof: see Appendix on p.18.
Lemma 2.6. In stage IIc (subgame starting at node G3), the government chooses subsidy
levels
s∗NI0 = s
∗
I0
=
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.19.
Proposition 2.7. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path of the
innovation game with subsidy control and no pre-commitment policy are given as follows.
Firm 1 does not innovate (NI) if (r − 1)(∆b1)
2 + 2β∆b1 − αβ
2 ≤ 0 where
α =
b2
4
(
2(N + 2)3
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
−
1
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
)
> 0;
β = cb − b1n + d1 > 0;
∆b1 = b1 − b1n
and innovates and offers N licenses (IN) otherwise. The royalty and quantities in equilib-
rium are given by
υ∗ =
b2(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
;
x∗1g(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
; x∗1g(IN) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Government sets subsidy levels
s∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
s∗NIN ∈
{
s : s ≤
[b2(N − 2)− d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1 + d1) + b2(N + 2)(b1 − b1n)
4b2 + d2(N + 2)2
+ d1
}
,
s∗IN =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Firms of type 2 innovate (I) if firm 1 chooses IN and produce quantities
x∗2g(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
,
x∗2g(IN) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
2[d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2]
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.20.
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3 Optimal subsidy policy in the presence of innova-
tion: pre-commitment case
In the pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to stick to its green electricity
policy (in terms of subsidy) even under innovation. Possible reasons for pre-commitment
include: imperfect information, limited ability for short-run policy adjustments etc. Com-
pared to the no pre-commitment assumption, pre-commitment appears to be more realistic,
because in the real world there are always difficulties in adjusting policies, for reasons like
the ones described above. Besides, there may be other costs associated with policy adjust-
ment, similar to the menu costs in the price adjustment case, that further stymies quick
policy reaction to innovations.
We maintain the basic assumptions made in the no pre-commitment case, except that
the subsidy levels remain unchanged after the innovation has occurred.
We consider an extensive-form game presented in Fig. 2. There are two decision stages.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (NI), to innovate and offer N licenses
in the competition stage II (IN), or to innovate and offer no licenses in stage II (I0).
Simultaneously, the government determines the subsidy levels s˜NI for non-innovating and
s˜I for innovating firms in order to maximize social welfare.
Stage II. Given the innovation decision of firm 1 and the decision of the government
about the subsidy level, firms 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, all firms have identical cost functions Cg(·) and compete
in quantities given the subsidy level s˜NI per unit of green electricity (subgame Γ˜NI).
(IIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage II, then it first offers
licenses to N competitors in return of a royalty υ˜ given the subsidy levels s˜I and s˜NI .
Firms 2, 3, . . . , N + 1 can either accept or reject this offer. Since firms 2, 3, . . . ,
N+1 are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the offer and operate
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Figure 2: Extensive-form game representation, pre-commitment case, subsidy policy
with cost function Cg(·) (competition in quantities will take place in subgame Γ˜I,NI)
or all of them will accept it and operate with cost function Cgn(·) (competition in
subgame Γ˜I,I).
(IIc) If firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage 3, then
firm 1, operating with cost function Cgn(·), and firms 2, 3, . . . , N + 1, operating
with cost function Cg(·), compete in quantities given their subsidy levels s˜I and s˜NI ,
respectively.
Proposition 3.1. There exist two sets of subgame-perfect equilibria in the innovation game
with subsidy control and pre-commitment policy. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies
on the equilibrium path of these two sets are given as follows.
Set 1. Firm 1 does not innovate (NI) and produces quantity
x∗1g(NI, (s˜
∗1
NI , s˜
∗1
I )) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
10
of green electricity. Government chooses subsidy levels (s˜∗1NI , s˜
∗1
I ) such that
s˜∗1NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
;
s˜∗1I ∈
[
−(cb − b1n)±
√
2b2
N + 2
(
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
+ 4r(∆b1)2
)]
.
Firms of type 2 produce quantity
x∗2g(NI, (s˜
∗1
NI , s˜
∗1
I )) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
of green electricity.
Set 2. Firm 1 innovates and offers N licenses (IN) in return of a royalty
υ˜∗ =
b2(N + 2)(cb − b1 + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
per unit of green electricity produced by firms of type 2 and itself produces quantity
x∗1g(IN , (s˜
∗2
NI , s˜
∗2
I ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
of green electricity. Government sets subsidy levels (s˜∗2NI , s˜
∗2
I ) such that
s˜∗2NI ∈
[
−(cb − b1)±
√
b2
(
b2(N + 2)3(cb − b1n + d1)2
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− 4r(∆b1)2
)]
;
s˜∗2I =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Firms of type 2 innovate (I) and produce quantity
x∗2g(IN , (s˜
∗2
NI , s˜
∗2
I ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
2[d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2]
of green electricity.
Proof: see Appendix on p.20.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Madlener et al. (2009) found that the conventional wisdom related to the equivalence of
tax (subsidy) and quota (certificate) schemes in terms of static efficiency may not hold if
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markets for electric power are imperfectly competitive. Due to the inequivalence found in
terms of social welfare, the authors recommend targeted subsidies as being the preferable
policy instrument.
In this paper, we have followed up studying the merits of price control policies for
promoting renewable electricity generation. In particular, we study the role of government
regulatory pre-commitment when technical innovation is present.
In the pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to stick to its green electricity
policy (in terms of subsidy) even under innovation. Possible reasons for pre-commitment
include: imperfect information, limited ability for short-run policy adjustments etc. Com-
pared to the no pre-commitment assumption, pre-commitment appears to be more realistic,
because in the real world there are always difficulties in adjusting policies, for reasons like
the ones described above. Besides, there may be other costs associated with policy adjust-
ment, similar to the menu costs in the price adjustment case, that further stymies quick
policy reaction to innovations.
We maintain the basic assumptions made in the no pre-commitment case, except that
the subsidy levels remain unchanged after the innovation occurred. We can conclude that,
from the viewpoint of social welfare maximization, the relative merits of the subsidy policies
are the same with or without pre-commitment. However, in terms of dynamic efficiency,
this equivalence does not necessarily hold. Rather, the no pre-commitment policy is shown
to support equilibrium outcomes with innovations that might not be attainable under
pre-commitment.
An important finding concerns the issue whether the existence of equilibrium solutions
depend on pre-commitment. The sets of subgame-perfect equilibria derived in this paper
confirm that pre-commitment can influence the equilibrium conditions. In particular, under
no pre-commitment a sufficiently high cost reduction would necessarily lead to innovation
and exclude the possibility that no innovation occurs. By way of contrast, both equilibria
are possible under pre-commitment even if the cost reduction by the innovation is high.
Still, under pre-commitment an equilibrium with innovation remains possible in a case
of a relatively low cost reduction as opposed to the no pre-commitment case. It follows
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that a government with a preference for innovations being performed if the achievable cost
reduction is high (and otherwise not) should be in favor of the no pre-commitment regime.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Suppose that firm 1 does not innovate in stage I, i.e. it chooses action NI.
The subsidy level chosen by the government for all firms in stage II is sNI . Given a competitive market
in stage III, a representative power generator i faces the optimization problem
max
xib,xig
[pxib + (p+ sNI)xig − Cb(xib)− Cg(xig)], (A.1)
where xib and xig denote the amounts of electricity produced by firm i from fossil/nuclear (‘brown’) and
renewable (‘green’) energy sources, respectively, and p, the average market price for electricity. The f.o.c.
for an interior solution are
p −C′b[x
∗
ib] = 0 (A.2)
p +sNI − C
′
g[x
∗
ig] = 0. (A.3)
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Inserting (A.2) into (A.3) reveals that in an optimum with xib > 0 and xig > 0, the government subsidy
sNI has to be equal to the difference (in absolute terms) between C
′
g[x
∗
ig] and cb, i.e. the marginal costs
of green electricity evaluated at the optimum and the constant marginal cost of brown electricity. The
intuition behind this result from an economic perspective is that if sNI > C
′
g[x
∗
ig]− cb, then all generators
will exclusively supply green electricity. In contrast, if sNI < C
′
g[x
∗
ig]−cb, no green electricity at all will be
provided. Given the assumptions of a competitive market and homogeneous costs, the subgame solution is
described by (A.2) and (A.3). In particular, all firms produce the same quantity of green electricity given
by
xig(NI, sNI) =
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
, (A.4)
while each firm’s profit amounts to
pii(NI, sNI) =
(cb − b1 + sNI)
2
4b2
. (A.5)
Proof of Lemma 2.2 Suppose that firm 1 innovates and announces to offer N licenses. The
government determines welfare-maximizing subsidy levels sNIN for non-innovating and sIN for innovating
firms. We denote the royalty for the new technology per unit of green power as υ. In equilibrium, it must
not exceed the cost difference Cg(x2g)− Cgn(x2g), as otherwise there is no incentive to switch to the new
technology.
Subgame ΓIN ,NI. Suppose that firms 2, 3, . . . , N+1 (from here on: firms of type 2) rejected firm 1’s
offer. Then firm 1 operates with the new cost function Cgn(x1g) while firms of type 2 continue to operate
with the cost function Cg(x2g). Thus, firm 1’s profit maximization problem is given by
max
x1b,x1g
[px1b + (p+ sIN )x1g − Cb(x1b)− Cgn(x1g)−R(b1 − b1n)], (A.6)
while firm 2’s profit maximization problem corresponds to (A.1) with i = 2 and sNI = sNIN . Thus,
quantities of green electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are given by
x1g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
cb − b1n + sIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
cb − b1 + sNIN
2b2
,
and firms’ profits therefore amount to
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
(cb − b1n + sIN )
2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n);
pi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
(cb − b1 + sNIN )
2
4b2
.
Subgame ΓIN ,I . Now suppose that firms of type 2 accept firm 1’s offer and pay a royalty of υ per
unit of green electricity produced. Then all firms operate with the new cost function Cgn(xg). The profit
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maximization problems of firm 1 and firms of type 2 are respectively given by
max
x1b,x1g
[px1b + (p+ sIN )x1g − Cb(x1b)− Cgn(x1g) +Nυx2g −R(b1 − b1n)]; (A.7)
max
x2b,x2g
[px2b + (p+ sIN )x2g − Cb(x2b)− Cgn(x2g)− υx2g]; (A.8)
the quantities of green electricity produced are
x1g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
cb − b1n + sIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
cb − (b1n + υ) + sIN
2b2
.
The firms’ profits thus amount to
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
(cb − b1n + sIN )
2
4b2
+Nυ
cb − (b1n + υ) + sIN
2b2
−R(b1 − b1n);
pi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
(cb − (b1n + υ) + sIN )
2
4b2
.
Firms of type 2 decide in stage IIIb whether to reject (NI) or accept (I) the offer, depending on the
comparison of the maximum profits calculated for subgames ΓIN ,NI and ΓIN ,I . Thus, their subgame-
perfect equilibrium actions are given as follows:
 NI if υ > υ
max := (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN )
I if otherwise.
In other words, υmax is the highest possible royalty level at which firms of type 2 innovate.
Firm 1’s decision in stage IIIb is based on the maximization of its profits w.r.t. royalty level υ.
Notice that firm 1’s profit, provided firms of type 2 accept the offer pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I), is always
at least as high as if they reject it as long as υ ∈ [0, cb − b1n + sIN ]. Moreover, the profit function
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) attains its maximum in υ at the royalty level υ = (cb− b1n+sIN )/2. Thus, taking
into consideration the possible case of a corner solution, firm 1’s equilibrium offer υ∗ in stage IIIb is given
by
υ∗ =


υmax = (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
2
otherwise.
This offer will always be accepted by a firm of type 2 in the equilibrium6. Green electricity produced by
firm 2 in the subgame starting at node G2 thus amounts to
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), I) =


(cb − b1 + sNIN )
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
otherwise.
6As usual, we assume that in a case of indifference firms of type 2 decide in favor of the adoption of
the new technology.
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Firms’ profits in this subgame are thus given by
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), I) = (A.9)
=


(cb − b1n + sIN )
2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)+
+N [(b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN )]
cb−b1+sNIN
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + sIN )
2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n) otherwise,
pi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), I) =


(cb − b1 + sNIN )
2
4b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
(cb − b1n + sIN )
2
8b2
otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2.3 Suppose that firm 1 innovates but offers no licenses to competitors (I0). The
government determines welfare-maximizing subsidy levels (sNI0 , sI0). Firm 1, after innovating, operates
with the new cost function Cgn(x1g) and firms of type 2 continue to operate with the cost function Cg(x2g).
Thus, firm 1’s profit maximization problem is given by
max
x1b,x1g
[px1b + (p+ sI0)x1g − Cb(x1b)− Cgn(x1g)−R(b1 − b1n)], (A.10)
while firm 2’s profit maximization problem corresponds to (A.1) with i = 2 and sNI = sNI0 . The quantities
of green electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are therefore given by
x1g(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
;
x2g(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
.
Firms’ profits therefore amount to
pi1(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
(cb − b1n + sI0)
2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n); (A.11)
pi2(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
(cb − b1 + sNI0)
2
4b2
. (A.12)
Proof of Lemma 2.4 Given the decision of firm 1 not to innovate, the government anticipates all
firms’ optimal quantity decisions in the subgame ΓNI and maximizes the social welfare function
WNI(sNI) = Q
(
a−
Q
2
)
+ (N + 1)pii(NI, sNI)− sNI(N + 1)xg(NI, sNI)
+d1(N + 1)xg(NI, sNI)− d2[(N + 1)xg(NI, sNI)]
2 (A.13)
=
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+ (N + 1)
(cb − b1 + sNI)
2
4b2
− (N + 1)sNI
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
+(N + 1)d1
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
− d2(N + 1)
2 (cb − b1 + sNI)
2
4b22
(A.14)
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with respect to sNI . The socially optimal subsidy level is thus given by
s∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, (A.15)
while the equilibrium quantities and profits are
xig(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
;
pii(NI) =
b2(cb − b1 + d1)
2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
.
Proof of Lemma 2.5 Given the decision of firm 1 to innovate and offer N licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcomes of subgames ΓIN ,NI , ΓIN ,I , as well as that of the royalty bargaining
subgame, and faces the social welfare function
WIN (sNIN , sIN ) = Q
(
a−
Q
2
)
+ pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN )) +Npi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ))
−sINx1g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))−NsINx2g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))
+d1 [x1g(NI, (sNIN , sIN )) +Nx2g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))]
−d2 [x1g(NI, (sNIN , sIN )) +Nx2g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))]
2
.
Since the outcome of the following subgame crucially depends on whether condition
(b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) ≥
cb − b1n + sIN
2
(A.16)
is satisfied, the welfare function in stage IIb is a piecewise-defined continuous function. We distinguish
two cases, depending on whether or not condition (A.16) is fulfilled.
Case 1: condition (A.16) is satisfied. The government maximizes the welfare function
WIN (sNIN , sIN ) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+ 2(N + 1)
(cb − b1n + sIN )
2
8b2
− R(b1 − b1n)
−sIN (N + 2)
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
+d1(N + 2)
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
− d2(N + 2)
2 (cb − b1n + sIN )
2
16b22
with respect to (sNIN , sIN ) and subject to constraint (A.16). The socially optimal subsidy level is given
by
s∗IN =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
. (A.17)
The maximum welfare level attained in this case is
W ∗(IN ) =
(N + 2)2(cb − b1n + d1)
2
4[(N + 2)2d2 + 4b2]
−R(b1 − b1n).
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Case 2: condition (A.16) is not satisfied. The government maximizes the welfare function
W ′IN (s
′
NIN
, s′IN ) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+
(cb − b1n + s
′
IN
)2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)
+N [(b1 − b1n)− (s
′
NIN
− s′IN )]
cb − b1 + s
′
NIN
2b2
+N
(cb − b1 + s
′
NIN
)2
4b2
−s′IN
cb − b1n + s
′
IN
2b2
−Ns′IN
cb − b1 + s
′
NIN
2b2
+d1
(
cb − b1n + s
′
IN
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + s
′
NIN
2b2
)
−d2
(
cb − b1n + s
′
IN
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + s
′
NIN
2b2
)2
with respect to (s′NIN , s
′
IN
) and subject to constraint (A.16) reversed with <. The socially optimal subsidy
levels are given by
s′∗NIN =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1) + b2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
; (A.18)
s′∗IN =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
. (A.19)
The maximum welfare level to be attained is
W ′∗(IN ) =
(N + 1)(cb − b1n + d1)
2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
−R(b1 − b1n).
A simple computation shows that W ∗(IN ) > W
′∗(IN ) for any N > 0. Thus, the optimal decision of the
government in stage IIb is given by any combination of subsidies
(s∗NIN , s
∗
IN
) =
(
s∗NIN ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
,
where
s∗NIN ≥ (b1 − b1n) +
[b2(N − 2)− d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Proof of Lemma 2.6 Given the decision of firm 1 to innovate and offer no licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcome of subgame ΓI0 and maximizes the welfare function
WI0(sNI0 , sI0) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+
(cb − b1n + sI0)
2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n) +
+N
(cb − b1 + sNI0)
2
4b2
− sI0
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
−NsNI0
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
+d1
(
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
)
−
−d2
(
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
)2
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with respect to (sNI0 , sI0). The socially optimal subsidy levels in this subgame coincide for the innovating
firm and the non-innovating firms and are given by
s∗NI0 = s
∗
I0
=
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
. (A.20)
Proof of Proposition 2.7 In stage I, firm 1 anticipates optimal decisions of the government and
other firms in the subsequent subgames and thus decides whether or not to innovate (and if so, whether
to offer licenses) based on its maximum profits to be attained given the utility-maximizing decisions of
other players. First of all, observe that, for any N > 0, pi1(IN , (sNIN ,sIN )) > pi1(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)). Thus,
firm 1 will never take the strictly dominated action I0 in stage I. Consequently, the solution depends on
the comparison of profits attained from playing NI and IN :
pi∗1(NI) =
b2(cb − b1 + d1)
2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
;
pi∗1(IN ) =
(N + 2)3b2(cb − b1n + d1)
2
2[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− r(b1 − b1n)
2.
IN is preferable if pi1(IN ) ≥ pi1(NI). Condition pi1(IN ) ≥ pi1(NI) is satisfied if
(N + 2)3b2(cb − b1n + d1)
2
2[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
−
b2(cb − b1 + d1)
2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
≥ r(∆b1)
2
or, equivalently, if
(r − 1)(∆b1)
2 + 2β∆b1 − αβ
2 ≤ 0. (A.21)
The solution of ineq. (A.21) depends on the value of concavity parameter r. In particular, if r = 1,
condition (A.21) is satisfied for ∆b1 ∈ (0, αβ/2). If r > 1, it is satisfied for any
∆b1 ∈
(
0,
β
r − 1
(√
1 + α(r − 1)− 1
)]
.
Finally, if 0 < r < 1, this condition is satisfied for
∆b1 ∈
(
0,
β
1− r
(
1−
√
1− α(1 − r)
)]
∪
[
β
1− r
(
1 +
√
1− α(1 − r)
)
,∞
)
.
Thus, the equilibrium outcome depends on the R&D cost of innovation and thus on the marginal cost
difference ∆b1. The subgame-perfect equilibrium action of firm 1 in stage I is given by IN for a sufficiently
low value of ∆b1 (with the notable exception of the case with r < 1 when sufficiently large values of r
support this equilibrium, too). By way of contrast, if ∆b1 is too high, then the only action of firm 1
sustainable in a subgame-perfect equilibrium is NI.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 In stage III, competition takes place given firm 1’s decision in stage I
and the government’s decisions in stage II. Notice that subgame Γ˜NI is equivalent to ΓNI with sNI = s˜NI ,
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subgames Γ˜I,NI and Γ˜I,I , respectively, to ΓI,NI and ΓI,I with (sNIN , sIN ) = (s˜NI , s˜I), and subgame Γ˜I0 ,
to ΓI0 with (sNI0 , sI0) = (s˜NI , s˜I). The maximum profit levels of firm 1 in these subgames are therefore
given by:
pi1(NI, (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
(cb − b1 + s˜NI)
2
4b2
;
pi1(I0, (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
(cb − b1n + s˜I)
2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n);
pi1(IN , (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
=


(cb − b1n + s˜I)
2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)+
+N [(b1 − b1n)− (s˜NI − s˜I)]
cb−b1+s˜NI
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (s˜NI − s˜I) <
cb − b1n + s˜I
2
;
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + s˜I)
2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n) otherwise.
Under the pre-commitment regime, the government (G) sets the subsidies without any information
about the innovation decision of firm 1. Moreover, firm 1 makes its decision whether to innovate or not
(and if so, whether to offer licenses) prior to the announcement of the subsidy levels set by the government.
Therefore, both decisions can be considered to be made simultaneously and can be modeled as a normal-
form game taking place in stages I and II. In this game, firm 1 chooses one of three actions {NI, IN , I0},
while the government determines a pair of subsidies (sNI , sI).
In a Nash equilibrium of this normal-form game, any equilibrium strategy of a player must belong to
the set of best responses to an equilibrium strategy of the other player. The government’s best responses
(BRG) to firm 1’s actions are equivalent to its actions in stage II in the no pre-commitment case:
s1 = (s1NI , s
1
I) := BRG(NI) =
{(
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, sI
)
: sI ∈ R
}
;
s2 = (s2NI , s
2
I) := BRG(IN ) =
{(
sNI ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
:
sNI ≤
4b2(b1 − b1n)− d2(N + 2)
2(cb − b1) + b2(N − 2)(cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
4b2 + d2(N + 2)2
}
;
s3 = (s3NI , s
3
I) := BRG(I0) =
=
(
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
)
.
Firm 1’s best responses (BR1) to s
1, s2, and s3 can be derived by observing its profits as functions of
subsidy levels given in (A.5), (A.9), and (A.11). Notice that, since the government’s best response to IN
is given by s2 = (s2NI , s
2
I) as shown above, condition (A.16) cannot be violated in a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, if firm 1 chooses action IN in stage I it faces the profit function
pi1(IN , (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + s˜I)
2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n).
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Moreover, since pi1(IN , (s˜NI , s˜I)) > pi1(I0, (s˜NI , s˜I)) for any (s˜NI , s˜I)), action I0 is strictly dominated and
thus cannot be played in a Nash equilibrium. Hence, action s3 = (s3NI , s
3
I) of the government cannot
be supported in an equilibrium since it constitutes a best response to the strictly dominated action I0
only. Action NI is a best response of firm 1 to (s1NI , s
1
I) if pi1(NI, (s
1
NI , s
1
I)) ≥ pi1(IN , (s
1
NI , s
1
I)). A
rearrangement shows that this condition is satisfied if
s1I ∈
[
−(cb − b1n)±
√
2b2
N + 2
(
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
+ 4r(∆b1)2
)]
, (A.22)
where ∆b1 = b1 − b1n. Therefore, the first set of Nash equilibria is given if player 1 does not innovate
and the government chooses (s1NI , s
1
I) with s
1
NI given above and s
1
I satisfying condition (A.22). By an
appropriate choice of s1I , the government is able to prevent or allow for the occurrence of this equilibrium.
Action IN is a best response of firm 1 to (s
2
NI , s
2
I) if pi1(IN , (s
2
NI , s
2
I)) ≥ pi1(NI, (s
2
NI , s
2
I)). After solving
for s2NI , we obtain the following condition:
s2NI ∈
[
−(cb − b1)±
√
b2
(
b2(N + 2)3(cb − b1n + d1)2
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− 4r(∆b1)2
)]
. (A.23)
The second set of Nash equilibria is given if player 1 innovates and announces to offer N licenses, while
the government chooses (s2NI , s
2
I) with s
2
I given above and s
2
NI satisfying condition (A.23).
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